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One of the key stories of the UK’s general election was the extent to which pre-election polling
understated the true level of Conservative support in the electorate. Oliver Heath writes that while many of the
lessons have been learned from the last major polling debacle in the UK in 1992, it may be time to take probability
sampling more seriously.
The last time the pre-election polls got it this wrong was 1992 – when the polls predicted a slight lead for Labour
only for the Tories to win the popular vote by some 7 percentage points. Since then the polling companies have
changed the way that they carry out and report their polls, but reﬂecting on what went wrong in 1992 may shed
some light on what happened this time out, and whether the lessons of previous mistakes have truly been learned.
Many of the alleged culprits for the 1992 debacle are similar to those being bandied about to explain the 2015
debacle, and the curious phenomenon of the ‘shy tory’ has once again reared its timid head. After 1992, like now, an
inquiry was set up to investigate the sources of the error. The report to the Market Research Society (MRS) by the
working party on the opinion polls and the 1992 general election was published in 1994, following an earlier interim
statement published just a few months after the election. In addition a number of academic studies analysed the
performance of the 1992 election polls and examined the sources of error.
The MRS report concluded that three main factors contributed to the error in the 1992 polls: late swing,
disproportionate refusals and inadequacies in the quota variables used. All these sources of error went in the same
direction, resulting in an underestimation of the Conservative vote and an overestimation of the Labour vote.
However, the 1992 report received a somewhat critical reception and a number of later academic studies argued
that the report failed to get to the heart of the problem. The report highlighted inadequacies in the implementation of
quota sampling – but as Roger Jowell and colleagues argued in a series of articles in the 1990s – did little to
address the inadequacy of quota sampling per se. Even back then people within the academic community were
urging the pollsters to think more seriously about selection and non-response bias, and to consider the adoption of
probability sampling methods in order to reduce these biases.
So what has happened since then? One major change has been to do with the quota variables that pollsters use
and the variables they use to weight their data. The MRS report concluded that the 1992 election poll samples were
biased primarily because some quota targets were inaccurate (to do with the size of the working class population)
and the choice of quota variables was inadequate, in that the variables used were often not very strongly associated
with vote choice (such as age and gender). The polling community has taken both of these criticisms on board, and
now routinely adjust their data according to political variables, such as recall of past vote or party identiﬁcation.
Unsurprisingly these variables are very strongly associated with vote intention, some might argue too strongly, and
thus in times of political ﬂux they may provide a rather unstable base for adjustment. But perhaps more importantly,
these types of quota or weighting variables still focus to a certain extent on addressing the symptoms of the error
rather than the cause.
To a certain extent pollsters have had some success at treating the symptoms, in that their attempts to correct for
error probably result in more accurate estimates of vote intention than if they simply did nothing. One way to further
improve the accuracy of polls would therefore be to further think about how they can better correct for error, perhaps
by considering more or better quota and weighting variables. But a more radical solution is to try and think of ways
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in which there is less error to correct for in the ﬁrst place.
One way to think about this is to consider what would happen if the pollsters did nothing to adjust their data, and
simply selected samples using random probability. The telephone polls have reasonably good coverage of the adult
population – though with the decline of landlines this coverage probably isn’t as good as it was in 1992 – but they
achieve very low response rates, which can lead to biased samples. By contrast internet polls, that rely on a panel of
volunteers who are paid to complete surveys, have very poor coverage of the adult population and are not at all
representative of the adult population (though the exact composition of these panels are shrouded in secrecy). A
purely random sample would therefore also be biased, even before non-response is taken into account.
The accuracy of both types of poll thus depend upon the adjustments that are made to the data, either after it has
been collected in the form of weighting or before the sample has been selected in terms of quotas. The more data
has to be adjusted, the more scope there is for something to go wrong. The resulting estimates of vote intention are
therefore based more on a predictive model of what pollsters think public opinion looks like than they are based on
an actual snapshot of what the public really think.
After the 1992 debacle pollsters were urged to think about how they select their samples and to consider methods of
random selection. If the polling industry is to regain credibility among the general public, media, politicians and
academics, it will need to address this issue seriously. With the rise of internet polling there is now scope to do this,
but it will cost money. A number of online surveys in Europe have experimented with recruiting panel members
through random selection rather than relying on volunteers, and although the start-up costs are high, it may be a
price worth paying.
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